What the recorders show about Miami’s deadly runway overrun
The NTSB’s preliminary findings also document a landing clearance issued without wind information despite a tailwind component; investigators have not said whether that omission affected the accident.1,3,9
The recorders describe the final approach and rollout, but the investigation has not resolved why the approach continued or why the attempted go-around was abandoned.12,13,14,15,16,18
- The NTSB says the 767 overran the runway after arriving from San Juan, killing five people on the ground and seriously injuring three others.9
- The NTSB’s cockpit summary records repeated excessive-speed cautions and other alerts; its flight-data summary records braking, a brief increase to go-around thrust, and braking again, with no indication that speed brakes or thrust reversers deployed.9
- The preliminary report records that the controller cleared the flight to land without the wind information required when a tailwind component exists; investigators have not determined whether the omission affected the crew or the outcome.1,9
- Amazon suspended operations with 21 Air after the crash, while 21 Air said it would review the preliminary report and its procedures.4,10
- The NTSB has not issued a probable-cause determination; why the crew continued the approach and then abandoned the go-around remains unresolved.12,13,14,15,16,18
On September 6, 2026, 21 Air Flight 7598, a Boeing 767 cargo flight operating for Amazon from San Juan, overran Runway 30 at Miami International Airport after landing. The NTSB says five people on the ground died, three were seriously injured and the two crewmembers sustained minor injuries.9
The NTSB’s recorder summaries describe repeated warnings about excessive speed during the approach and a go-around call after touchdown, followed by a short increase in thrust and a return to idle as braking resumed.9
The crash and the first recorder disclosures
The NTSB’s preliminary report records that Flight 7598, a Boeing 767-33A operating a cargo flight for Amazon from San Juan to Miami, overran Runway 30 at about 1:53 p.m. EDT on September 6, 2026, and struck two ground vehicles. Five people on the ground died, three were seriously injured, both crewmembers sustained minor injuries, and the aircraft was substantially damaged.9
On September 9, the NTSB said it had recovered and successfully read out the cockpit voice recorder and flight-data recorder. The agency said a written transcript would be prepared and cautioned that its descriptions and timing were preliminary and subject to change.8
The recorders were an Acron Aviation FA2100 cockpit recorder with more than two hours of audio and an Ontic solid-state flight-data recorder with about 54 hours and more than 400 parameters, according to the NTSB investigation page.9
Warnings on approach, then a go-around call after touchdown
The NTSB’s preliminary cockpit-voice summary says that about 1 minute 42 seconds before the recording ended, one pilot called for flaps 20 and the other cautioned that the aircraft was too fast. The summary records further excessive-speed comments, electronic “sink rate” and “too low terrain” alerts, and no consistent verbal response to the speed cautions.9
The NTSB’s flight-data summary places nose and right-main-gear touchdown at 158 knots groundspeed. It records the brakes being applied at 146 knots, then released at 120 knots as the throttles increased to values consistent with go-around thrust; the throttles were reduced to idle and braking resumed at 117 knots.9
The NTSB’s cockpit summary places a go-around call about 15 seconds before the recording ended and sounds of the aircraft leaving the paved surface about 10 seconds before the end. Its flight-data summary says there was no indication that speed brakes or thrust reversers deployed during the rollout.9
The NTSB has not established why the approach continued despite the warnings, why the go-around was initiated after touchdown, or why it was abandoned.12,13,14,15,16,18
The wind information omitted from the landing clearance
The NTSB preliminary report records that the controller cleared Flight 7598 to land without providing wind information, although FAA Order JO 7110.65BB requires wind direction and velocity to be stated when a tailwind component exists. AeroTime reports that winds had been given to another flight about four minutes earlier as 190 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 22 knots.3,9
The reported wind figures vary across accounts. USA Today gives winds from 190 degrees at about 21 mph, gusting to 25 mph; AeroTime reports 19 knots gusting to 22 knots for the earlier advisory; and Morning Overview describes winds of 190 degrees gusting above 20 knots. These accounts should not be treated as identical measurements.1,3,4
Former NTSB member John Goglia called the failure to share the wind conditions a significant omission but said it would not, by itself, have caused a crash; former FAA official Tony Mello said issuing such information was the controller’s responsibility.2
The NTSB has not determined whether the missing wind information affected the crew’s decisions or the outcome.1
What the preliminary findings do—and do not—resolve
The flight-data summary describes the aircraft’s recorded actions, including the touchdown, changes in braking and thrust, and the absence of recorded speed-brake or thrust-reverser deployment. It does not establish whether those systems were commanded but failed or were not selected.6,9
The preliminary report is not a probable-cause determination. The NTSB’s investigation page lists the FAA, Boeing, GE Aerospace, 21 Air, the Miami-Dade Aviation Department, NATCA and the 21 Air Pilots Association as parties to the investigation.1,9
The NTSB’s investigation continues to leave the explanatory questions open: why the crew continued the approach, why the go-around was initiated after touchdown and abandoned, and how aircraft systems, weather, training, procedures and crew coordination contributed.12,13,14,15,16,18
Operator response and the runway’s arresting system
Amazon suspended operations with 21 Air after the crash, the BBC reported. USA Today reported that 21 Air said on October 1 that it had received the preliminary report and would review it alongside its operational protocols.4,10
CargoForwarder Global reports that Miami’s runway had no Engineered Materials Arresting System, or EMAS. The NTSB has not concluded what difference an arresting system would have made in this crash.7,12,17
The NTSB says 21 Air Flight 7598 overran Runway 30 at Miami International Airport after arriving from San Juan; five people on the ground died.9
The NTSB said it had recovered and successfully read out the cockpit voice and flight-data recorders and described its timing and account as preliminary.8
USA Today reported that the NTSB released its preliminary report and that 21 Air said it would review the report and its operational protocols.4
WOFL published a report about the NTSB’s preliminary findings in a segment dated October 2 at 1:29 p.m. EDT.5
- The NTSB's determination of probable cause for the accident.
- Why the crew continued the unstable approach despite repeated warnings.
- Why the go-around was initiated after touchdown and then abandoned.
- Whether the speed brakes and thrust reversers were commanded but failed, or were simply not selected by the crew.
- The specific impact, if any, of the controller's failure to provide wind information on the crew's decisions and the outcome.
- The final findings from the ongoing investigation into aircraft maintenance, crew training, and operator procedures.
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.Secondary reportWOFL — NTSB releases new report in Miami cargo plane crash
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.Primary documentSept. 6 — FAA statements on aviation accidents and incidents
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
- 17.Secondary reportSept. 10 — NPR follow-up on the Miami cargo plane crash
- 18.
- Revision 14 · October 27, 2026 · material update
- Revision 13 · October 27, 2026 · material update
- Revision 12 · October 26, 2026 · material update
- Revision 11 · October 26, 2026 · material update
- Revision 10 · October 23, 2026 · material update
- Revision 9 · October 23, 2026 · material update
- Revision 8 · October 21, 2026 · material update
- Revision 7 · October 21, 2026 · material update
- Revision 6 · October 21, 2026 · material update
- Revision 5 · October 3, 2026 · material update
- Revision 4 · October 3, 2026 · material update
- Revision 3 · October 2, 2026 · material update